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COMMENTS
maintain an action the day he was so appointed where the bank-
rupt could not maintain such an action the day before the re-
organization petition was approved. If the jurisdiction of the
federal court is concurrent with that of the state court, an even
greater anomaly would result if Judge Clark's dissenting opinion
were adopted: the trustee would be able to sustain his action in
a federal court because of the Bankruptcy Act, but if federal
jurisdiction were based upon diversity grounds or the cause
pursued in a state court by the bankrupt prior to reorganization
proceedings, or by the trustee following the proceedings, the
action would be dismissed.
When this is brought to light, the opinion of the court in the
principal case that the proceeding was based wholly upon a
state created claim which was not incorporated into the Bank-
ruptcy Act and was not to be construed as being a part of "pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy" for which uniformity was sought, is the
only proper and practical conclusion.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-NON-LIABILITY OF WHOLESALER
FOR UNWHOLESOME PACKAGED FOOD
Plaintiff's wife purchased some "apricot puff" cookies in their
original package from a retail grocer, who had previously bought
them from defendant, a wholesaler. In eating one of the cookies
he was injured when he swallowed a wire allegedly contained
therein. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. On ap-
peal the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's de-
cision and certified the question of whether the wholesaler is
directly liable to the consumer to the Texas Supreme Court. On
the first hearing, the question was answered in the affirmative,
but on a re-hearing, the question was answered in the negative,
four judges dissenting. The liability of the wholesaler is logically
contingent on that of the retailer. Since the retailer is not liable
to the consumer because he has no better knowledge of the con-
tents of the container than the consumer, the wholesaler is not
liable.1
The court in the principal case reached the same result as the
majority of courts which have considered this problem, but for a
1. Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 251 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1952).
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different reason.2 The chief reason advanced by other tribunals
for their denial of recovery has been the lack of an immediate
contractual relation between the parties.3 The Texas court, how-
ever, does not conceive liability under an implied warranty as con-
tractual but rather as a liability imposed by operation of law as
a matter of public policy." Therefore the privity problem was not
even discussed in the principal case. Instead the court took the
position that, as a matter of logic, the wholesaler is not liable on
such facts unless the retailer would be liable on the same facts.
Since Texas has not adopted the Uniform Sales Act, the determi-
nation of the possible liability of the retailer was guided by com-
mon law rules.
At common law, the retailer who sold to the consumer for im-
mediate consumption impliedly warranted the wholesomeness or
fitness of the food.5 This warranty was based on the belief that
the consumer should be allowed to rely on the judgment of the
retailer, who, because of his experience in dealing with food, was
in a better position to inspect and judge its fitness for human
consumption. 6 With the development of the technique of packag-
ing food in sealed containers, however, a question arose as to the
applicability of this warranty to such food since there was no
way for the retailer to inspect it and the consumer therefore
could not reasonably rely on the skill of the retailer. The result
2. Carlson v. Turner Centre System, 263 Mass. 339, 161 N.E. 245 (1928) ;
De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336(1937); Cornelius v. B. Fillipone and Co., 119 N.J.L. 540, 197 Atl. 647
(1938) ; Singer v. Zabelin, 24 N.Y.S.2d 962 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941). Contra:
Swengle v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2d 930
(1938); Nelson v. West Coast Dairy Co., 5 Wash. 2d 284, 105 P.2d 76
(1940).
3. Carlson v. Turner Centre System, supra note 2, De Gouveia v. H. D.
Lee Mercantile Co., supra note ?, Cornelius v. B. Fillipone and Co., supra
note 2, Singer v. Zabelin, supra note 2.
It will be noted that there was an additional privity problem in the
principal case due to the fact that plaintiff's wife and not plaintiff purchased
the cookies. Some courts have avoided this issue by considering the wife as
the agent for the husband. Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316
(1943) (the retailer was not held liable but on grounds other than lack of
privity); Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931) ; Visusil v. W. T. Grant Co., 253 App. Div. 736, 300 N.Y. Supp. 652
(2d Dep't 1937). As was pointed out above, however, the court in the prin-
cipal case did not consider this problem since it conceived liability under
implied warranty not as contractual but as liability imposed by operation
of law.
4. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
5. 1 WILLISTON, SALEs § 242 (3d ed. 1948).
6. Ibid.
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was a split of authority with regard to the retailer's liability."
Those courts which extended his liability under an implied war-
ranty of fitness to canned and packaged food advanced the follow-
ing reasons, among others, for their decisions: (1) the retailer's
superior skill, which then applied, not to his inspection of the
goods, but to his selection of a reputable and reliable manufac-
turer," (2) the protection of public health, 9 and (3) the practical
consideration that if liability were imposed on the retailer, he in
turn could recoup his losses from the manufacturer or whole-
saler from whom he purchased the goods.10 The tribunals that
refused to allow recovery against the retailer stated the same
reason as that given in the principal case, i.e., that since the re-
tailer could not possibly ascertain whether the contents of the can
or package were unwholesome, the consumer could not reasonably
rely on his judgment and therefore it would be unfair to subject
him to liability.', This reasoning has been questioned as injecting
a fault element into the situation, and, therefore, as being con-
7. The following cases held that the retailer was not liable: Scruggins v.
Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925); Bigelow v. Maine Central R.R.,
110 Me. 195, 85 Atl. 396 (1912); Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165
Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933); Julian v. Laubenberger, 16 Misc. 646, 38
N.Y. Supp. 1052 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1896); Pennington v. Cranberry Fuel
Co. 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.T. 610 (1936). In the following cases the retailer
was held liable: Sencer v. Carl's Market, 45 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950); Sloan
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 193 Ill. App. 620 (1915); Chapman v. Roggenkamp,
182 Ill. App. 117 (1913); De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo.
App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336 (1937); accord, Rabb v. Covington, 215 N.C. 572,
2 S.E.2d 705 (1939). The case of Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623,
164 S.W.2d 835 (1942), in which the retailer was held liable, was in effect
overruled in the principal case.
8. De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 452, 100
S.W.2d 336, 339 (1937).
9. Chapman v. Roggenkamp, 182 II. App. 117, 121 (1913).
10. De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 452, 100
S.W.2d 336, 339 (1937). Another reason that has been advancd for holding
the retailer liable is that if the consumer were allowed to recover from the
manufacturer or packer only, he might have considerable difficulty in reach-
ing that party so as to be able to sue him. See Swengle v. F. & E. Whole-
sale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 561, 77 P.2d 930, 935 (1938). The same
reason was expressed in Griggs Canning Co. v. Josey, 139 Tex. 623, 633, 164
S.W.2d 835, 840 (1942), which case was in effect overruled in the principal
case.
11. Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S.W. 743 (1925); Bigelow v.
Maine Central R.R., 110 Me. 105, 85 Atl. 396 (1912); Kroeger Grocery Co.
v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726 (1933); Julian v. Laubenberger, 16
Misc. 646, 38 N.Y. Supp. 1052 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1896); Pennington v. Cran-
berry Fuel Co., 117 W. Va. 680, 186 S.E. 610 (1936). It has been further
argued that public safety could be preserved by allowing the consumer to
recover from the manufacturer, the party actually at fault. See Kroeger
Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 82, 145 So. 726 (1933).
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trary to the common law concept of warranty, which held the
seller liable regardless of fault. 2 In addition to mentioning that
the retailer could recoup his losses from the wholesaler or manu-
facturer, the dissent in the principal case seemed to adopt this
criticism of the majority rationale. 13
Another common law theory on the basis of which the defen-
dant in the principal case could possibly have been held liable is
the implied warranty of merchantability, which was imposed in
the case of a sale by description as distinguished from a sale of
specific goods. 14 It seems clear that the cookies in question were
not merchantable, 5 but the facts of the principal case do not in-
dicate explicitly whether or not the sale was by description. Had
the retailer selected the cookies on plaintiff's wife's request for
some "apricot puff" cookies, there is little doubt but that the sale
would have been by description. 6 If, however, plaintiff's wife
had selected the cookies herself from the shelf, it might be
argued that the package was specified and that therefore no such
warranty could be implied; or, on the other hand, the contention
could be advanced that though the package was specified due to
the purchaser's selection, the cookies themselves were still sold
by description, in which case the warranty would still attach. In
any event, these arguments were not considered in the principal
case.
In the cases which have arisen under the Uniform Sales Act,
the great weight of authority holds that the retailer is liable to
the immediate consumer for unwholesome canned or packaged
foods on the basis of the implied warranty of fitness set forth
in that act.'17 Moreover, it has been stated that the implied war-
12. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242 (3d ed. 1948).
13. See Bowman Biscuit Co. of Texas v. Hines, 251 S.W.2d 153, 161(Tex. 1952) (dissenting opinion).
14. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 230a (3d ed. 1948). A sale by description oc-
curred where the identification of the goods which were the subject matter
of the bargain depended solely upon a description of them and not upon
an observation of them by the parties. 2 id. § 224. The term "merchanta-
bility," though it has been given a variety of meanings, at least required
that the goods be salable as goods of the general kind which they were de-
scribed to be when purchased. 2 id. § 243.
15. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105(1931).
16. Ibid.
17. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (1932);
Ward v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N.E. 225(1918); Gimenez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191
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ranty of merchantability of the same statute offers an alternative
theory by which the purchaser of unwholesome canned or pack-
aged goods can recover against the retailer.ls
If it is postulated that the imposition of liability under implied
warranty is a matter of policy, it seems clear that the decision on
the issue in the principal case could be made either way because
there are valid arguments on both sides. It is, however, sub-
mitted that the reasoning in the principal case is to a certain
extent faulty. To state categorically that the wholesaler should
be liable if the retailer is liable does not take into consideration
the fact that the profit margin of the wholesaler is smaller than
that of either the retailer or the manufacturer and the fact that
the wholesaler probably has even less opportunity than the re-
tailer to inspect the goods.
TORTS - LABEL OF "COMMUNIST DOMINATED"
HELD LIBELOUS PER SE
An officer of defendant organization mailed a letter and mime-
ographed enclosures to members of the organization's board of
directors and to certain newspapers. The mimeographed enclo-
sures dealt with the qualifications of candidates for election and
in the course of discussion referred to plaintiff organization as
being Communist dominated. In plaintiff's suit for libel the dis-
trict court awarded judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, held:
affirmed. To write that an organization is Communist dominated
is to subject such organization to public hatred and contempt, to
its immediate harm, and is, therefore, "libelous per se."'
A publication is said to be defamatory if it tends to injure the
reputation of another so as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him,2 and that criterion is appropriate whether the defama-
tion takes the form of libel or slander.3 Whereas, in the law of
N.E. 27 (1934). For a collection of cases in point, see Notes, 142 A.L.R 1434
(1943), 90 A.L.R. 1269 (1934).
18. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931).
1. Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farmers Service
Corp., 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952).
2. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 559 (1938).
3. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES, 415419 (1935); Carpenter, Defamation-
Libel and Special Damages, 7 ORE. L. REV. 353 (1928); Green, Relational
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